This is a revised version of an article published in Ancient Warfare 16.5 (2023)
In mid-June AD 61, the rebellion of Boudicca reached its bloody conclusion. The location of the defeat of the queen of the Iceni is uncertain. It presumably lay to the northwest of Verulamium (St. Albans), somewhere on the line of the Roman road known as Watling Street.
In the preceding weeks, Queen Boudicca, whose name translates as Woman of Victory, had known nothing but the satisfaction of brutal revenge.
Camulodunum (Colchester), the de facto capital of the Roman province of Britannia and not yet furnished with a city wall, was sacked and burnt, the Roman colonists massacred or later sacrificed. Part of the Ninth Legion, some 2,000 men, marching to the relief of the city, was annihilated. Boudicca then turned her attention to Londinium (London), the burgeoning Roman emporium on the Thames.
On learning of the revolt, the Roman governor, Suetonius Paulinus, abandoned his conquest of the Isle of Mona (Anglesey), and marched directly for Londinium. Accompanied by his favourite legion, the Fourteenth, Paulinus reached the town before the rebels but realised the impossibility of defending it. He retreated back along Watling Street with those civilians who could keep up. Boudicca arrived soon afterwards and Londonium was destroyed. She then moved in pursuit of Paulinus. He bypassed Verulamium, which was also sacked by Boudicca’s horde of Iceni and Trinovante warriors.
Soon after the fall of Verulamium, Paulinus received reinforcements and looked for a place to halt Boudicca’s advance.
A Disinterested Historian
In Kenneth Wellesley’s Teubner edition of books 11 to 16 of Tacitus’ Annals, our principal source for the revolt of Boudicca, the chapter concerning the fighting at the so-called battle of Watling Street is a mere 120 words of terse Latin (Annals 14.37). In fact, the actual defeat of Boudicca takes up 88 words and the remainder concerns the immediate aftermath.
“The battle, which is described very briefly, clearly did not interest Tacitus, and his lack of interest is reflected in a diminished attention to stylistic matters.” So wrote the late J.N. Adams in his D.Phil. thesis, ‘A Philological Commentary on Tactius, Annals, 14, 1-54’ (Oxford 1970, 354).
Adams had a point. Compared to his epic battle narratives in the Histories, or the detailed descriptions of Idistaviso in the Annals and Mons Graupius in the Agricola, Tacitus’ account of the battle on which the very existence of Roman Britain hinged is disappointingly cursory.
However, detail can be teased out of the brief account. Close study of Annals 14.37 and the preceding chapters (34-36) reveals much about the defeat of Boudicca. As this article considers Tacitus’ account, his spelling of the queen’s name is adopted, but the correct form is Boudica.
Annals 14.34: The Battlefield
Following the sack of Verulamium, Tacitus tells us that Paulinus decided to halt his retreat and look for a place (locus) to give battle. The bulk of the governor’s small army was made up of the Fourteenth Legion and a vexillation (detachment) of the Twentieth Legion, which may also have accompanied him on his mission to London. The legionaries were reinforced by proximis auxiliares, i.e. auxiliary regiments in the immediate area or those that joined Paulinus as he retreated. The army was now 10,000 strong, a puny force compared to the vast host led by the queen of victory.
Some modern scholars have assumed that Paulinus’ army was actually somewhat larger, the addition of another legionary vexillation making it 11-13,000 strong, but there is no reason to doubt Tacitus’ figure. Instead, Paulinus bolstered his numbers with topography.
Tacitus describes the locus where Paulinus determined to oppose Boudicca as an artis faucibus. This was a defile or narrow pass between two hills. Although in the vicinity of Watling Street, it was a pass to nowhere. The road certainly did not cut through it; the rear was closed off by a thick wood. In front of the fauces - the direction from which Boudicca was approaching - lay an open plain. Paulinus thus considered his rear and flanks secure and would have a clear view of the approaching enemy. There was no cover on the empty plain for any insidiae (tricks or ambushes).
Tacitus does not dignify the locus with a name. It may be that the fauces was unnamed but the surrounding area would certainly have been, even if only after the name of the local tribe. And, considering his sources, Tacitus must have known the name of the locality.
Tacitus wrote his Annals long after the event in the early second century AD, but as a senator he had access to Paulinus’ official dispatches and memoirs. What is more, as a young man, Tacitus almost certainly discussed the battle with a notable veteran of the conflict. That man was Julius Agricola, the conqueror of Caledonia and Tacitus’ beloved father-in-law. Interestingly, Agricola does not make an appearance in the Annals, but Tacitus’ biography of the great man informs us how he began his military career as a tribune on the staff of Suetonius Paulinus in Britannia, where he first tasted gloria (glory) at the defeat the rebels (Agricola 5, 16).
Location
We can infer that the location of Paulinus’ fauces lay beyond Verulamium, but how far along Watling Street?
The remainder of the Ninth Legion was cowering in its fortress, probably at Lindum (Lincoln), but Paulinus had ordered the Second Legion to reinforce him (Annals 14.32, 37). It was based at Isca (Exeter) and, by marching up the Fosse Way, could have joined Paulinus at the junction with Watling Street at High Cross.
This was also a suitable rendezvous for the remainder of the Twentieth, based at Burrium (Usk), and for elements of Paulinus’ forces marching back from Deva (Chester), which had probably acted as the muster point and supply depot for his Mona operation.
The area around the High Cross junction is therefore a favourite starting point for those taking on the challenge of finding the battlefield. Graham Webster’s preferred location lay not far distant at Mancetter, known to the Romans as Manduessedum (Boudica: The British Revolt Against Rome AD 60 (1978), 97, 111).
While it agrees with Tacitus’ topography to a certain extent, Webster’s site in the vicinity of Mancetter requires Paulinus’ army to cross the River Anker in order to attack the Britons, and vice versa, but a river does not feature in Tacitus’ account. Contrast Annals 12.34-35, where a river is the key feature of the battle site selected by Caratacus because it will impede the Romans’ line of advance.
Margaret Hughes has investigated the subtleties of the Latin term fauces (see Further Reading, below). She concludes that Tacitus’ text may point to a “forked defile, or a defile with more than one section or even a multiplicity”. Like Webster, she is a proponent of Mancetter but locates the fauces in the defiles on Oldbury Ridge. Hughes also wonders about the etymology of the unusual Romano-British placename Manduessedum. Derived from British mandu (horse/pony) and Gaullish essedo (chariot), was the Place of the Horse Chariot an old Celtic name that pre-dated AD 61 or did it arise from the battle?
Another suggested battle site is Windridge Farm, St Albans, where Roman glandes (sling bullets) have been discovered immediately outside of ancient Verulamium. Are they evidence of a battle? Possibly of the defence of the city against Boudicca, but they can hardly relate to her battle with Paulinus. Moreover, the topography does not match Tacitus’ description. However, Windridge does remind us that all Roman soldiers were trained in the use of the sling (cf. Vegetius 1.16). Tacitus’ battle account (at 14.36-37) mentions pila (heavy javelins), hastae (spears) and tela (various forms of missile). It is possible that some of Paulinus’ soldiers launched glandes at the Britons.
Annals 14.34: Battle Formations
Wherever Tacitus’ fauces is, the limited space meant that Paulinus’ legionaries were drawn up in the centre in frequens ordinibus – in close ranks. The auxiliary infantry were on either side. We should probably envisage three column-like formations of infantry. The cavalry turmae (squadrons) were positioned on the flanks, mostly auxiliary horsemen, but with equites from the Fourteenth Legion (perhaps 120, cf. Josephus, Jewish War 3.120) and perhaps some others from the Twentieth.
Boudicca’s army, arriving on the plain, assumed no such order. The queen’s men roved around confidently in small bands (catervae) of foot and horse. These strutting warbands, already acting like victors, were organised according to tribe and kindred (nationes). The army was too huge for Tacitus to supply a number. It was a multitude made even greater by the presence of the wives of the warriors. The Britons’ wagons, presumably loaded with supplies and plunder, were formed up at the edge of the plain and provided the women with viewing platforms for the coming victory.
Paulinus had a clear view, either on horseback or from a higher vantage point on the flanks of the fauces. Was he awed by the size of the enemy? Probably. But its lack of order and cohesion was evident, and it had unwittingly corralled itself between his position and the wagons which were blocking the exits from the rear of the plain.
Paulinus is often remembered as the apparently overcautious Othonian general of the civil war of AD 69 (Tacitus, Histories 2.26). The commander of AD 61 was not foolhardy but he was dynamic, aggressive and hungry for a victory to outshine the triumphs of his rival Corbulo (cf. Annals 14.29). Boudicca presented him with that opportunity.
Annals 14.35: Boudicca’s Speech
Tacitus moves on to Boudicca’s speech. The queen’s words are the historian’s invention, but the detail concerning Boudicca in a chariot, with her daughters beside her and driving from band to band to harangue the British warriors, surely derives from the observations of Paulinus and Agricola.
Tacitus could easily guess at the substance of her exhortation: her outrage at the seizure of her kingdom by the Roman oppressors, her torture and the rape of her daughters, and the need for revenge.
As the widow of Prasutagus, client king of Rome, Boudicca was most probably a Roman citizen. Similar status, and the legal protections and privileges that went with it, can be assumed for her daughters. Prasutagus’ attempt to leave half the Iceni kingdom to Emperor Nero and half to his two daughters (with Boudicca as regent) was naïve, but Tacitus probably felt a degree of sympathy for the outrages endured by Boudicca in the brutal Roman takeover of the whole kingdom.
Tacitus has Boudicca emphasise the British tradition of women warriors leading armies but she plays no part in the fighting. She also reminds her warriors of their recent victories; their massed war cry (clamor) and charge (impetus) would terrify and then destroy Paulinus’ army, just as it had served to overwhelm the Ninth Legion.
Annals 14.36: Paulinus’ Speech
Even with Boudicca’s warriors baying in the background, the Roman commander was confident in the virtus (valour and excellence) of his men. He instructed them to spurn the cries and threats of the barbarians and joked about the number of women in the barbarian horde. There were more feminae than iuvenes (i.e. men of military age), and the latter were unwarlike and poorly equipped. Paulinus reminded them of previous Roman victories, of how the Britons would lose nerve and break at the first onset.
Paulinus then made an appeal to glory. “Even among many legions, it is a few who really decide the battle, and it will enhance their glory that a small force should earn the renown of an entire army.” This was irresistible to Roman warriors. Agricola may well have reminisced about the speech with Tacitus. It is notable that Agricola’s own career was dominated by the pursuit of gloria (Agricola 5, 8, etc.).
The Ten Thousand were fighting for glory and representing the renown (fama) of the garrison of Britannia and the Roman army as a whole, but Paulinus was also indicating that the legionaries in the front ranks would bear the brunt of the imminent fight.
We have already seen that Paulinus’ army was in close order. He emphasised the need to maintain formation (conferti tantum), and after the pila were thrown, the soldiers were to advance relentlessly, batter with shield bosses (umbones), stab with swords and pile up the dead. There would be no halting to plunder the fallen: “When the victory has been won, everything will be in your power.”
The veterans were enthused by Paulinus’ speech and prepared to hurl their pila on his signal.
Annals 14.37: The Battle
The resolution of the Romans must have been palpable. Despite their earlier cockiness, the Britons did not launch a wild impetus on Paulinus’ position. Tacitus uses the term suggressus: their advance was cautious.
When the Britons came into range, Paulinus gave the signal and the legionaries and auxiliaries hurled their javelins and spears until the missiles were exhausted. The Roman infantry then attacked in cuneus formations. As there was no pause to reorganise their ranks, we can suppose Paulinus had arranged the soldiers into cunei when they took up position in the fauces.
“A cuneus is a battle formation, but a battle formation that resists rigid definition.” - Margaret Hughes
What was a cuneus? It is usually thought of as a close formation for breaking through enemy lines (e.g. Livy 7.24; Caesar, Gallic War 6.40).
The literal translation of cuneus is wedge and so a sharp triangular formation might be envisaged, but it was also the term applied to a keystone. According to Vegetius, the late Roman military theorist, the cuneus was narrower at the front than at the rear and known in military slang as the pig’s head. The counter-formation deployed against it was the forfex (forceps) (Vegetius 1.26, 3.17-19; compare Ammianus Marcellinus 17.3.9).
Vegetius’ description of the cuneus is interesting because his battle formation was not necessarily used like a battering ram. It allowed the missiles of as many soldiers as possible to be concentrated on a single point of the enemy line. In this case, one might imagine a formation like an inverted V.
Tacitus’ use of the term cuneus was variable. He might apply it to a division of an army devastating its way through barbarian territory (Annals 1.51), or to the small subunits in non-linear battle lines (Histories 2.42). A column of legionaries assaulting the gate of a city is described as a cuneus, as is what might actually have been a hollow square formation of Batavian auxiliaries (Histories 3.29, 4.20). But in all cases cuneus refers to an aggressive military formation.
The cuneus of legionaries erupted out of their static position in the fauces. The two auxiliary cunei followed and charged at the run (impetus). The majority of the Britons abandoned their advance and fled back across the plain. A few bands of brave warriors refused to retreat but were speared by the Roman cavalry, who had galloped ahead of the cunei. The panicked Britons found escape blocked by their own wagons.
The Roman soldiers were merciless: warriors, women and baggage animals were slaughtered. Tacitus describes it as a shining and glorious victory, to rival the famous Roman triumphs of old. He puts the number of British dead at almost 80,000 for the cost of only 400 Roman dead (one of the rare occasions Tacitus records Roman casualties) and about the same number wounded.
The scale of the British casualties seems extraordinary but may not be entirely fanciful. Two major British nations were on the march from their homelands in what is now East Anglia and not just warriors, but also their wives and households (cf. Annals 14.38). One assumed Boudicca attracted allies from other British tribes during her triumphant progress.
The end of Boudicca, who plays no part in Tacitus’ brief account of the fighting, is noted in passing: she committed suicide by taking poison. Did this happen on the battlefield or did she manage to escape from the plain? We do not know.
Tacitus ends his account with a second suicide, that of Poenius Postumus, the camp prefect and acting commander of the Second Legion. Postumus had already disobeyed Paulinus’ order to reinforce his army. When news arrived of the feats of the Fourteenth and Twentieth at the great victory, the prefect considered that he had robbed his legion of gloria. He did the honourable thing and fell on his sword.
Further Reading: Names, Chronology, Sources and Location
On the meaning and correct spelling of Boudica’s name, see K. Jackson, ‘Queen Boudicca?’, Britannia 10 (1979), 255.
Tacitus dates Boudic(c)a’s revolt to the consulship of Caesennius Paetus and Petronius Turpilianus (Annals 14.29), that is AD 61. Some consider this an error and believe the revolt broke out in AD 60, but the Tacitean date is followed here. K.K. Carroll, ‘The Date of Boudicca’s Revolt’, Britannia 10 (1979), 197-210, argues that the Queen’s rebellion was a violent but brief affair, flaring up in early May and ending in total defeat some five weeks later in mid-June AD 61. However, it remains possible that Boudica was making preparations for war in AD 60.
Suetonius Paulinus wrote an account of his famous campaign in the Atlas Mountains in AD 41 (Pliny, Natural History 5.14-15). Not unsurprisingly, Paulinus’ memoirs – unfortunately lost to us – also included details of his defeat of Boudica. This can be deduced from clues in Pliny and Tacitus: see N. Reed, ‘The Sources of Tacitus and Dio for the Boudiccan Revolt’, Latomus 33 (1974), 926-933.
Writing in the early third century AD, the senator and historian Cassius Dio had access to material deriving from Paulinus’ memoirs, but his version of ‘Buduica’s’ rebellion is far inferior to that of Tacitus. There are, however, some points of interest in Dio’s treatment of the final battle.
In order that all of his soldiers can hear him, Paulinus delivers his speech to each of the three divisions of the army (Dio 62.9-11). Dio’s generic account of the actual fighting is worthless, but his mention of archers in the Roman ranks (62.12.3) reminds us that bowmen, or at least soldiers with some training in archery, were present in all Roman units (Vegetius 1,15; CIL VI 37262 for an archery instructor of the Second Parthian Legion). Finally, Dio has the impressively tall and golden-haired queen (his famous description: 62.2.3-4) escape from the battlefield and later succumb to illness (62.12.6).
For the topography of Mancetter, the possible location of Tacitus’ fauces, and the etymology of Manduessedum, see Margaret Hughes, ‘A Process of Inference: Boudica at Mancetter’, Warwickshire History 19.2 (2023/24), 43-58. For other potential locations, see Steve Kaye’s ‘Finding the Site of Boudica’s Last Battle’.